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Gramsci’s Revolutions: Passive and Permanent* 
 
Antonio Gramsci’s distinctive notion of “passive revolution” has received increasing 
attention in recent years, both in terms of theoretical studies of its internal coherence, and 
in terms of empirical studies using it to analyse contemporary political processes. This 
notion was first hesitatingly sketched out in twenty-seven notes intermittently written 
between late 1930 and early 1935, in the texts that later became known as the Prison 
Notebooks. Gramsci’s focus on the role of intellectuals in the organization of culture was 
the subject of debate immediately following the publication of a thematic edition of his 
carceral writings in the late 1940s, while the concept of “hegemony” – surprisingly, given 
its subsequent fortunes – only rose to prominence after 1956.1 It was not until the 1970s, 
however, and increasingly following the publication of Valentino Gerratana’s landmark 
critical edition of the Prison Notebooks in 1975, that more attention began to be dedicated 
                                                        
* Previous versions of this paper were presented at conferences and seminars at Mimar Sinan Güzel Sanatlar 
Üniversitesi, Istanbul, in the Department of Political Economy at University of Sydney, and at the University 
of Oxford. I am grateful to participants at those events for their critical engagement with my arguments. I 
would also like to thank Francesca Antonini, Rjurik Davidson, four anonymous readers and the co-editors of 
this journal for helpful comments and criticisms. 
1 On the history of the reception of hegemony in the early 1950s, see Francesca Chiarotto, “I primi dieci anni 
(1948–1958). Note sulla ricezione del Gramsci teorico politico: la fortuna dell’egemonia,” in Angelo D’Orsi, 
ed., Egemonie (Naples, 2008) and Francesca Chiarotto Operazione Gramsci: alla conquista degli intellettuali 
nell'Italia del dopoguerra (Milano, 2011). On the different seasons of Gramsci studies, see Guido Liguori, 
Gramsci conteso. Interpretazioni, dibattiti e polemiche 1922–2012 (Rome, 2012). 
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to passive revolution.2 There has since been a proliferation of readings of its significance, 
its distinctiveness in comparison to other theories of revolution, and its “actuality” in 
different political conjunctures. From obscurity at the time of its formulation and relative 
neglect during the first 25 years of Gramsci’s postwar fame, passive revolution has 
progressively become one of the most important red threads used in philological studies 
that seek to navigate their way through the labyrinth of the Prison Notebooks.3 
                                                        
2 On the focus on passive revolution in the debates of the 1970s, see Fabio Frosini, “Beyond the Crisis of 
Marxism: Thirty Years Contesting Gramsci’s Legacy,” in Jacques Bidet and Stathis Kouvelakis, eds., 
Critical Companion to Contemporary Marxism (Leiden, 2007). Seminal early contributions included Franco 
De Felice, “Una chiave di lettura in ‘Americanismo e fordismo’,” Rinascita – Il Contemporaneo, 29/42 (27 
October 1972), 33–5; and Franco De Felice, “Rivoluzione passiva, fascismo, americanismo in Gramsci,” in 
Franco Ferri, ed., Politica e storia in Gramsci, Volume 1 (Rome, 1977) 161–220. For a critical 
contextualization of these essays, see Franco De Felice, Il presente come storia, eds. Gregorio Sorgonà and 
Ermanno Taviani (Rome, 2017). Perhaps under the influence of the debate on the Risorgimento as a “failed 
agrarian revolution” [rivoluzione agraria mancata] initiated by Rosario Romeo in the 1950s, discussions 
prior to De Felice’s interventions did not tend to emphasize the specificity of passive revolution, when it was 
noted at all. See Rosario Romeo, Risorgimento e capitalismo (Bari, 1959), and compare to Renato Zangheri, 
“La mancata rivoluzione agraria nel risorgimento e i problemi economici dell’unità,” Studi gramsciani. Atti 
del convegno tenuto a Roma nei giorni 11–13 genaio 1958 (Rome, 1958). On the influence of the concept of 
a rivoluzione mancata on Risorgimento studies, see A. William Salomone, “The Risorgimento between 
Ideology and History: The Political Myth of rivoluzione mancata,” The American Historical Review, 68/1 
(1962), 38–56. 
3 See, for example, Dora Kanoussi, Una introducción a los Cuadernos de la cárcel de Antonio Gramsci 
(México D.F, 2000); Pasquale Voza, “Rivoluzione passive,” in Fabio Frosini and Guido Liguori, eds., Le 
parole di Gramsci: per un lessico dei “Quaderni del carcere” (Rome, 2004); Alvaro Bianchi, O laboratório 
de Gramsci Filosofia, História e Política (São Paulo, 2008); Peter D. Thomas, The Gramscian Moment: 
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Passive revolution, however, has not only become significant for studies of Gramsci 
or the history of Marxism. It is also now one of the most influential of concepts derived 
from the various Marxist traditions in wider historical and contemporary scholarship. It has 
been productively employed to analyze instances of state formation and popular rebellion 
in such diverse cases as the contradictions of modernization in Wilhelmine Germany, the 
(post) colonial Indian State, revolutionary Mexico and its aftermaths, the “pink tide” in 
Latin America and its antecedents (particularly in Brazil), the rise of Islamism in Turkey, 
post-Apartheid South Africa, the Egyptian Revolution and Arab Spring.4 At least four 
different understandings of the meaning of passive revolution can be identified in recent 
scholarship. First, it has been thought to represent a reformulation of the more established 
concept of “(bourgeois) revolution from above”, understood as a process in which existing 
                                                        
Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism (Leiden, 2009); Fabio Frosini, “Reformation, Renaissance and the state: 
the hegemonic fabric of modern sovereignty,” Journal of Romance Studies, 12/3 (2012); Antonio di Meo, 
“La «rivoluzione passiva» da Cuoco a Gramsci. Appunti per un’interpretazione’,” Filosofia italiana (2014). 
4  Jan Rehmann, Max Weber: Modernisierung als passive Revolution (Hamburg-Berlin, 1998); Partha 
Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World – a Derivative Discourse? (London, 1986); Adam 
Morton, Revolution and State in Modern Mexico: The Political Economy of Uneven Development (Lanham, 
2011); Massimo Modonesi, “Revoluciones pasivas en América Latina. Una approximación gramsciana a la 
caracterización de los gobiernos progresistas de iniçio de siglo,” Horizontes gramscianos. Estudios en torno 
al pensammiento de Antonio Gramsci (Mexico City, 2013); Marcos Del Roio, “Translating Passive 
Revolution in Brazil,” Capital & Class, 36/2 (2010), 215–34; Carlos Nelson Coutinho, Gramsci’s Political 
Thought (Leiden, 2012); Cihan Tuğal, Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism 
(Stanford, 2009); Gillian Hart, Rethinking the South African Crisis: Nationalism, Populism, Hegemony (Atlanta, 
2014); Brecht De Smet, Gramsci on Tahrir: Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Egypt (London, 2016). 
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political elites instigate and manage periods of social upheaval and transformation. 5 
Second, passive revolution has been understood as a rival or complement to other macro-
historical sociological theories of state formation, modernization, or decolonization. 6 
Third, particularly when viewed through the lens of the Italian tradition of trasformismo, 
it has been conceptualized as a specific political strategy and technique of statecraft, and 
sometimes related to theories of governmentality.7 Fourth, passive revolution has been 
argued to constitute a useful lens for analyzing the nature and transformation of 
contemporary capitalism, whether understood as “neoliberalism” or in other terms.8 
In the course of its politically overdetermined history of reception, passive 
revolution has effectively become what Adam Morton has called a “portmanteau concept,” 
or, in an alternative formulation, a “continuum” of different interpretations: in effect, a 
                                                        
5 See Neil Davidson, “Scotland: birthplace of passive revolution,” Capital and Class, 34/3 (2010), 343–59. 
6  See Chris Hesketh, “Passive Revolution: a Universal Concept with Geographical Seats,” Review of 
International Studies, 43/4 (2017), 389–408. For an attempt to articulate passive revolution with the theory 
of uneven and combined development, see Jamie C. Allinson and Alex Anievas, “The Uneven and Combined 
Development of the Meiji Restoration: A Passive Revolutionary Road to Capitalist Modernity,” Capital and 
Class, 34/3 (2010), 469–90. For the claim that passive revolution represents the “general form of the 
transition from colonial to postcolonial national states in the 20th century,” see Chatterjee, Nationalist 
Thought and the Colonial World, 50. 
7  Christine Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci and the State (1975), trans. David Fernbach (London, 1981), 
emphasized the significance of trasformismo in a now classic study. Rehmann, Max Weber: Modernisierung 
als passive Revolution, develops this theme in relation to a (broadly Weberian) notion of rationalization. 
8 For attempts to think passive revolution in terms of such “contemporaneity,” see Tuğal, Passive Revolution; 
the articles included in the special issue of Capital & Class, 34/3 (2010); and Partha Chatterjee, “Democracy 
and Economic Transformation in India,” Economic and Political Weekly, 43/16 (2008), 53–62. 
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series of concepts with sometimes only the faintest of family resemblance.9 Each of these 
concepts has been (re-)constructed by emphasizing one or more of the themes that Gramsci 
develops under this rubric in one or more of his notes, in order then to propose an 
overarching interpretation of what passive revolution “really” means, or to locate its 
“conceptual core.”10 Despite their differences in approach or conclusions, the vast majority 
of these readings share, to a greater or lesser extent, three implicit interpretive 
presuppositions, each of which can be related to significant methodological tendencies in 
contemporary intellectual history: 
First, they posit that the most coherent way to comprehend passive revolution is “to 
narrativize” it, that is, to compose the chronologically sequential narrative of the “long 
nineteenth century” that seems to be dispersed throughout various notes in the Prison 
Notebooks in a non-linear form.11 This presupposition corresponds to what Hayden White 
has characterized as the tendency to regard narrative as a type of “meta-code” for the 
                                                        
9 Adam Morton, Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy 
(London, 2007), 68; Adam Morton, “The Continuum of Passive Revolution,” Capital & Class, 34/3 (2010), 
315–42. 
10 The notion of a “conceptual core” is explicitly theorized by Roberto Roccu, “Passive Revolution revisited: 
From the Prison Notebooks to our ‘great and terrible world’,” Capital and Class 41/3 (2017), 537–59 at 544. 
11 I have previously proposed one such narrativization in Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, 133–58. See also 
the accounts of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries provided under the rubric of passive revolution in 
Bianchi, O laboratório de Gramsci; Alberto Burgio, Gramsci storico. Una lettura dei ‘Quaderni del carcere’ 
(Rome-Bari, 2002); Alberto Burgio, Gramsci: Il sistema in movimento (Rome, 2014); Giuseppe Vacca, 
Modernità alternative: il novecento di Antonio Gramsci (Turin, 2017). 
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production of meaning and coherence, the form in which a rational order is imposed on 
otherwise discrete phenomena.12 
Second, they assume that this narrative is a vehicle for revealing Gramsci’s 
“intended meaning,” which it is the purpose of their readings either to reconstruct (in the 
case of philological studies) or, on the basis of a prior or assumed reconstruction, to deploy 
analytically (in the case of empirical studies).13  This presupposition can be related to 
Quentin Skinner’s reflections regarding the importance of taking into account both 
(internal) authorial intention and the “illocutionary force” of its (external, “conventional”) 
expression in order to reconstruct the “meaning” of any given statement in its historical 
context.14 
Third, they suppose that passive revolution is a “concept” that is expressive of this 
narrative and intended meaning because it either precedes or completes them. It precedes 
them, in the sense of the concept representing a logic of the generic that governs each 
particular appearance of the term, understood as realization of an intention; it completes 
                                                        
12 Hayden White, “The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality,” in The Content of the Form: 
Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore, 1987), 1–25, at 1, 24. 
13  Fabio Frosini’s work is the most developed example of a “reconstructive-intentional” philological 
approach of this type; see, most recently, Fabio Frosini, “Rivoluzione passiva e laboratorio politico: appunti 
sull’analisi del fascismo nei Quaderni del carcere,” Studi Storici 2 (2017), 297–328. Adam Morton’s 
reflections on methodologies in the history of ideas and the “unravelling” of Gramsci’s thought in the process 
of comprehending the present provides a representative example of an analytical deployment based on such 
a presupposition; see Morton, Unravelling Gramsci, 15–38. 
14 Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas” (1969), in Visions of Politics, 
Volume 1: Regarding Method (Cambridge, 2002), 57–102, at 45–8. 
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them, in the sense of the concept providing a unifying “summary” of the variety of 
potentially discordant meanings articulated in the course of the narrative. 15  This 
presupposition can be comprehended in terms of Reinhart Koselleck’s emphasis upon the 
multivalent unity that distinguishes the “genuine” concept from the mere word.16 
Taken together, these three interpretive presuppositions establish clear protocols 
for the reading of the role of passive revolution in the famously fragmentary and non-
systematic Prison Notebooks as a process of “reconstruction”: reconstruction of the implied 
but not chronologically presented narrative, reconstruction of the intended but not 
explicitly stated meaning, and reconstruction of the informing but nowhere clearly defined 
concept. Thus reconstructed, the significance of passive revolution has often been thought 
to consist primarily in its delineation of a distinctive concept of the process of modern state 
formation and (attempted or frustrated) transformation, either in Italy or more generally.17 
Strategic or political consequences can be derived from this perspective, and have been by 
                                                        
15 Callinicos’s notion of an “implicit” concept of passive revolution existing in a gestational state prior to its 
explicit nomination can be taken as an example of the former approach; see Alex Callinicos, “The Limits of 
Passive Revolution,” Capital and Class, 34/3 (2010), 491–507. De Smet’s reconstruction of passive 
revolution as a synthetic concept capable of comprehending organically the “constitution of the capitalist 
mode of production and bourgeois society” represents an example of the latter approach; see De Smet, 
Gramsci on Tahrir, 6, 37–71. 
16  Reinhart Koselleck, “Begriffsgeschichte und Sozialgeschichte,” Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik 
geschichtlicher Zeiten, Frankfurt/M., 1979, 107–29, at 119–20. 
17 John A. David ed., Gramsci and Italy’s Passive Revolution (London, 1979), 14: passive revolution “is in 
essence both a description of the nature of the [Italian] liberal state and an assessment of the shortcomings of 
that state.” 
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both Gramsci and his later readers; but it is this historical narrative and concept of state 
formation that is understood to be his primary and “intended meaning.” 
In this article, I offer an alternative understanding of the significance of passive 
revolution, based upon an alternative approach to the reading of the Prison Notebooks. 
Rather than assuming a unity of meaning of passive revolution throughout Gramsci’s 
different texts written between 1929 and 1935, I instead follow recent tendencies in 
Gramscian philological scholarship in insisting upon a diachronic and contextualist 
analysis of the use of passive revolution at particular moments in the drafting of the Prison 
Notebooks.18 However, unlike readings that posit a developmental history of a more or less 
unitary “concept” (according to a model of the actualization of a potential, the becoming 
explicit of the implicit, or the “maturation” of the previously only “embryonic”), I argue 
for a reading that attends more closely to the specificity and timing of each instance of 
usage, without presupposing their originary or eventual unification in a concept. 
                                                        
18 References to Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks are given to the Italian critical edition: Antonio Gramsci, 
Quaderni del carcere, ed. Valentino Gerratana (Turin, 1975). I follow the internationally established standard 
of notebook number (Q), number of note (§) and page reference. “A texts” refer to Gramsci’s first drafts; “C 
texts” to revised notes; while “B texts” exist in a single version. Dates of individual notes are given according 
to the chronology established in Gianni Francioni, L’officina gramsciana. Ipotesi sulla struttura dei 
‘Quaderni del carcere’ (Naples, 1984), and the revisions contained in Giuseppe Cospito, “Verso l’edizione 
critica e integrale dei «Quaderni del carcere»,” Studi storici, LII/4 (2011), 896–904. For a discussion of 
diachronic and contextual readings of the Prison Notebooks, informed by the tradition of Filologia d’autore, 
see Gianni Francioni, “Un labirinto di carta (Introduzione alla filologia gramsciana),” International Gramsci 
Journal, 2/1 (2016), 7–48. 
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Rather than attempting to reconstruct passive revolution as a distinctive historical 
narrative, political concept, or theory of state formation, therefore, I propose to consider it 
instead as a “heuristic formula.” With this notion, I aim to emphasize the way in which the 
formula of passive revolution functions as an organizing perspective – in different ways at 
different times – in Gramsci’s ongoing research process, rather than the extent to which it 
represents a novel narrative, concept, or theory. This article is therefore less concerned to 
analyze what passive revolution might be plausibly interpreted to “mean,” or the events 
that it was “intended” to signify, and more with the role played by the formula within what 
I propose to call the “lexical architecture” of the Prison Notebooks.19 My aims is to offer a 
reading of what the “narrative” of the Prison Notebooks – that is, the distinctive literary 
form and compositional process of Gramsci’s carceral writings – “does” to and with the 
formula of passive revolution. 
On the basis of this diachronic reading, I argue that the formula of passive 
revolution plays an important role in directing Gramsci’s research at certain decisive 
moments between 1930 and 1935, but that this function needs to be comprehended in the 
                                                        
19 I derive the notion of a “lexical architecture” from Peter de Bolla’s reflections on an “architecture of 
concepts”; see Peter de Bolla, The Architecture of Concepts. The Historical Formation of Human Rights 
(New York, 2013). However, whereas de Bolla’s project assumes a distinction between “words” and 
“concepts,” and focuses upon the organization of the latter, my conception of a “lexical architecture” aims 
instead to investigate the role played by words or discrete formulations in the economy and structure of a 
text, without presupposing the existence of concepts as their first, formal or final cause. In a Wittgensteinian 
sense, I aim to explore the way in which words can be conceived as “deeds” in the material act of their 
inscription, without reference to a prefigurative or summational instance, whether conceived as “intention” 
or “concept.” 
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context of Gramsci’s larger carceral project. This larger project did not consist in the first 
instance in the development of a novel theory of modern state formation. Rather, Gramsci’s 
more fundamental project in the Prison Notebooks consisted in the search for a political 
strategy that could be the “actual” form of “the revolution in permanence.” To a much 
greater extent than is generally recognized, Gramsci’s research on passive revolution 
emerged during the elaboration of his own distinctive contribution to the debate in the 
international Communist movement in the 1920s over the meaning of the notion of 
“permanent revolution.”20 As a “criterion” of historical research into the development of 
the modern state throughout the long nineteenth century, passive revolution is effectively 
a by-product of this more fundamental project; in its turn, the “punctual” elaboration of 
passive revolution helps to clarify Gramsci’s specific understanding of the “permanence” 
of the revolutionary movement required for the struggle against Fascism. It is in this 
perspective that the heuristic nature of passive revolution can be understood, as a 
characterization of the challenges confronting attempts to renew the slogan of the 
“revolution in permanence” in the changed political conditions of the interwar years. 
In the first section, I analyze the emergence of the formula of passive revolution in 
late 1930 as a reorganization of Gramsci’s prior researches, which had been dedicated to a 
                                                        
20 Important exceptions in the existing scholarship include the different readings offered by Fabio Frosini, 
Da Gramsci a Marx (Rome, 2009); De Smet, Gramsci on Tahrir; Juan dal Maso, El marxismo de Gramsci. 
Notas de lectura sobre los Cuadernos de la cárcel (Buenos Ares, 2016). While these studies register the 
theoretical importance of the relationship between passive and permanent revolution for Gramsci’s thought, 
they do not undertake the specification of the times and significance of their different uses that is attempted 
in this article. 
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distinctive assessment of the historical significance of Jacobinism, or what I characterize 
as a conception of “Metajacobinism.” I then trace Gramsci’s usage of passive revolution 
in relation to his reflections on permanent revolution between 1930 and 1933 in three 
related phases, focused on the figures of Croce, Machiavelli and Marx. I highlight in 
particular the importance of Gramsci’s conjugation of his research on passive revolution 
with his changing assessment of Marx’s 1859 “Preface.” 
In the second section, I analyze the development of Gramsci’s distinctive 
understanding of permanent revolution, demonstrating the way in which it accompanies 
and overdetermines his research on passive revolution in each of its phases. I suggest that 
Gramsci’s conception of “the revolution in permanence” should be distinguished from 
Trotsky’s more famous formulation, and be understood in relation to an alternative 
tradition of interpretation of Marx and Engels’s thought. In particular, I seek to explicate 
the implicit historical reference behind Gramsci’s repeated claim that Lenin’s theorization 
and practice of hegemony constitutes the “actual” and “sublated” form of the notion of “the 
revolution in permanence” derived from the experience of 1848. 
I finally suggest, in conclusion, that this reading opens new paths of research for 
the contemporary discussion of passive revolution. While the formula’s fertility for 
historical studies of state transformation or the analysis of current political dynamics is 
now well established, more attention should be given to the nature of Gramsci’s use of 
passive revolution as a form of political and strategic reflection. According to the reading 
of the dialectic between passive and permanent revolution developed in this article, the 
significance of passive revolution considered in its historical context consisted not only or 
even primarily in its status as a narrative, concept or theory of modern state development. 
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More significant than these dimensions was its role in clarifying Gramsci’s understanding 
of “the revolution in permanence,” and thus its novel contribution to the central strategic 
debates and political theory of the Marxist tradition of his time. It is in this perspective that 
passive revolution’s historical meaning and potential contemporary significance should be 
assessed today. 
 
Passive revolution in the Prison Notebooks 
 
The Prison Notebooks have become influential as a fundamental theoretical reference work 
in a wide range of academic disciplines across the social sciences and humanities. At the 
moment of their original composition, however, they were the “semi-private” documents 
of the imprisoned leader of a clandestine Communist Party, produced under complicated 
conditions of surveillance, with limited access to basic scholarly resources and texts, and 
in the midst of fundamental transformations in the international Communist movement. 
The multifaceted nature of Gramsci’s project in the Prison Notebooks was determined by 
two significant political perspectives: on the one hand, he attempted to analyze the nature 
of the Fascist regime’s consolidating strength, both in terms of its historical foundations 
and its contemporary functioning; and on the other hand, he sought to elaborate his already 
critical position in the international Communist movement in the context of deepening 
disagreements with the Communist International’s official strategy and tactics in the anti-
 13 
Fascist struggle in the late 1920s and early 1930s. This is the context in which Gramsci 
begins to explore the potential utility of the formula of passive revolution.21 
Many readings of passive revolution, encouraged by Gramsci’s habitual method of 
“narrating” his theoretical reflections, have focused on reconstructing the historical 
narrative of the long nineteenth century that seems to be presented in fragmentary and 
sometimes contradictory forms in a number of different notes.22 As an historical narrative, 
passive revolution has been understood as involving a progressive dilation of perspective, 
as Gramsci extends his analysis from Italy during the Risorgimento, to Europe in the epoch 
of high imperialism, to his contemporary global conditions defined by Fascism and 
“Americanism.” The reading offered here instead focuses on the discrete moments of 
passive revolution’s deployment as a heuristic formula within the Prison Notebooks. 
Rather than an “over-extension” or “stretching” of an originally national paradigm, these 
usages are defined by the consistent, “punctual” presentation of a fundamentally 
internationalist orientation already discernible at the outset of Gramsci’s research. 
The first note in which passive revolution seems to appear was written in February-
March 1930.23 As Gramsci briefly notes, he is appropriating the concept from Vincenzo 
Cuoco, the historian of the failed Neapolitan revolution of 1799. Gramsci’s innovation 
seems to consist in the projection of passive revolution beyond the Napoleonic period in 
                                                        
21 For a reconstruction of these dual perspectives and context, see Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, 197–
242. 
22 Valentino Gerratana, Gramsci. Problemi di metodo (Rome, 1997), 132. 
23 Q1, §44, pp. 40–54, at 41. 
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order to provide an analysis of the distinctive features of the later Italian Risorgimento.24 
Passive revolution thus appears both to originate in reflections on the Italian national 
context, and to organize them; indeed, given that the term occurs in the first sections of this 
long note dedicated to the Risorgimento, passive revolution can plausibly be understood as 
the foundational thesis of this particular note. In actual fact, however, this “first” 
appearance of passive revolution in the Prison Notebooks is a later, retrospective 
addition.25 Rather than a “passive revolution,” the Risorgimento was characterized at the 
moment of this note’s initial drafting as simply a “revolution without revolution,” or, 
slightly later in the same note, a “royal conquest.” 
                                                        
24 For Cuoco’s original usage of the term, see Vincenzo Cuoco, Saggio storico sulla rivoluzione di Napoli 
(1801), ed. A. De Francesco (Manduria, 1998), particularly 325–6. For a detailed study of the different 
emphases of Cuoco and Gramsci’s formulations, see Antonio di Meo, “La «rivoluzione passiva» da Cuoco a 
Gramsci”. 
25 A similar retrospective addition is made to Q1, §150, 133, originally written in late May 1930. Both 
Gerratana and Francioni note that ‘passive revolution’ is inserted in the margins of these notes at a later date, 
after the term is first used (in a chronological sense) in Q4 §57, 504, in November 1930. See Antonio 
Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere, ed. Valentino Gerratana (Turin, 1975), 2479 and Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni 
del carcere. Edizione anastatica dei manoscritti, ed. Gianni Francioni (Rome-Cagliari, 2009), Vol.1, 4. A 
more precise dating of this marginalia does not seem possible on the basis of external references or the 
manuscript itself. Gramsci may have inserted it immediately in November 1930, at some stage during 1931, 
or even in early 1932. It is significant to note that after November 1930 passive revolution is not used again 
in other notes until early 1932, in Q8, §25, 957, when Gramsci relates Cuoco’s formula to Quinet (and 
Gioberti). 
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The chronologically first note in which Gramsci refers to passive revolution, from 
November 1930, already deploys it in an expansive and global sense. 26  Rather than 
beginning with Cuoco’s definition, from which he would subsequently depart, Gramsci 
signals from the outset that, although he is appropriating the formulation from Cuoco, he 
intends to give it a distinct meaning. 
 
The concept of passive revolution seems to me to be precise not only for 
Italy, but also for other countries that modernize the state by means of a 
series of reforms or national wars, without going through a political 
revolution of the radical-Jacobin type. Examine how Cuoco develops the 
concept with regards to Italy.27 
 
Passive revolution is thus used here to describe the not-so-exceptional Sonderweg to 
modernity taken not only by Italy, but also by other European nation states that lacked a 
“Jacobin moment.” The Italian case is from the outset seen as a specific instance of this 
more general historical experience. 
                                                        
26 It is not coincidental that Gramsci begins to explore the significance of passive revolution in the same 
period in which he is engaged in intense political discussions (and disagreements) with fellow communist 
inmates in the Turi Prison. See Athos Lisa, Memorie: in carcere con Gramsci (Milan, 1973), and for a critical 
contextualization, Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci and the State, 237–90. 
27 Q4, §57, 504. For readings that emphasise the centrality of this note for all of Gramsci’s research on passive 
revolution, see Voza, “Rivoluzione passiva,” 195; De Felice, “Rivoluzione passiva, fascismo, americanismo 
in Gramsci,” 163. 
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Gramsci’s later usages of the formula of passive revolution represent a Janus-faced 
specification and elaboration of this initial perspective. On the one hand, he returns to the 
beginning of his research on the Italian Risorgimento, in Q1, §44, and revises it with a 
singular, seemingly marginal, addition that will fundamentally shape the way in which this 
note is approached by later readers. On the other hand, passive revolution is used 
thematically throughout the Prison Notebooks with a “punctual” rhythm, in which forms 
of historical narrative and strategic reflection jostle alongside each other for theoretical pre-
eminence. 
 
“Jacobinism (of content)” (February–March 1930) 
 
Looking backwards, the insertion of the formula of passive revolution at the outset 
of the discussion of the Risorgimento in Q1, §44 had a decisive impact on how passive 
revolution, this particular note, and the Prison Notebooks themselves were interpreted and 
reconstructed in later debates. Gramsci’s retrospective addition not only makes seem 
plausible those readings that have posited a projection of passive revolution from the 
national to the international level, in terms of an “extension” or “stretching” of what is only 
seemingly his initial perspective. 28 It also involves what amounts to an effective rewriting 
                                                        
28 Alex Callinicos, “The Limits of Passive Revolution,” argues that a tendency to “over-extension” (or, 
following Lakatos, “concept-stretching”) of passive revolution, both in Gramsci’s own writings and in those 
of later scholars, leads it to lose analytic precision. While he notes Gramsci’s retrospective insertion of 
“passive revolution” in his first Notebook (493), he nevertheless insists that “Gramsci uses the expression 
‘passive revolution’ initially as a means of interpreting the Risorgimento” (492) (a claim justified by recourse 
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of Q1, §44, which in turn appears to license a reading of the significance of this note as 
primarily being the “genesis” of passive revolution, rather than a condensation of 
Gramsci’s distinctive understanding of Jacobinism. 
In the initial composition of Q1, §44 in February-March 1930, it was Jacobinism, 
rather than passive revolution, that was used as the primary lens to read the Risorgimento. 
The focus of the original draft of this note (that is, before the marginal additions after 
November 1930) builds coherently upon a current of thought that Gramsci had been 
developing throughout Notebook 1, namely, the nature of city-country relations in Italian 
history. These notes could thus be characterized as a recasting of Gramsci’s pre-carceral 
project in Some Aspects of the Southern Question, though now viewed through the 
“Jacobin” lens that colors all of Notebook 1. 29  Q1, §44 begins by discussing the 
Risorgimento in a comparative internationalist perspective, focusing on the lack of 
‘Jacobinism’ in the Risorgimento; the failure of an adequate Jacobin force to emerge is a 
continuous refrain throughout the note; it concludes with enigmatic reflections on the 
“Jacobin” slogan of the “Revolution in Permanence”. 
The “Jacobinism” that Gramsci valorizes is not, however, the Jacobinism so often 
caricatured as an elitism or anathemized as an undemocratic putchism. The young Gramsci 
                                                        
to the notion of an “implicit” (or “practical”) presence of the “concept” of passive revolution in notes before 
Q4, §57, even if the formula itself is absent: see 493). His genealogy of passive revolution thus depends on 
ignoring the textual evidence that Gramsci used passive revolution in an “expanded” sense from the outset. 
29 On the presence of Jacobinism throughout Notebook 1, see Leonardo Paggi, “Giacobinismo e società di 
massa in Gramsci,” in Massimo L. Salvadori and Nicola Tranfaglia, eds., Il modello politico giacobino e le 
rivoluzioni (Florence, 1984). 
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himself had not been immune to the influence of these readings, stridently declaring in 
1917 that “the Russian revolutionaries are not Jacobins.” 30  He soon abandoned this 
perspective, under the influence of Mathiez, whose Le Bolchévisme et le Jacobinisme 
Gramsci had translated for L’Ordine Nuovo in 1921.31 Equally important seems to have 
been Gramsci’s deepening appreciation of a Russian tradition of Jacobinism, above all in 
Lenin’s thought, 32  and, increasingly throughout the Prison Notebooks, the novel 
suggestion of Machiavelli’s “precocious Jacobinism.”33 The result of this effective self-
critique is a novel reading of the historical significance and “actuality” of Jacobinism.34 
The Jacobinism that interests Gramsci, and whose absence in the Italian 
Risorgimento he bemoans, is neither an “energetic fanaticism” of revolutionary virtue,35 
nor a forerunner of twentieth century totalitarianisms, which have constituted the focus of 
                                                        
30 Antonio Gramsci, Scritti (1910–1926), Vol, 2, 1917, ed. Leonardo Rapone (Rome, 2015), 255. 
31 On the significance of Gramsci’s encounter with Mathiez, see Sabrina Areco, “Antonio Gramsci e Albert 
Mathiez: jacobinos e jacobinosmo nos anos de Guerra,” Revista Outubro, 24 (2015). 
32 Rita Medici, Giobbe e Prometeo: filosfia e politica nel pensiero di Gramsci (Florence, 2000), 153. For 
Lenin’s invocation of a “plebeian Jacobinism,” see Massimo L. Salvadori, “Il giacobinismo nel pensiero 
marxista” in Il modello politico giacobino e le rivoluzioni, and Norman Levine, “Jacobinism and the 
European Revolutionary Tradition,” History of European Ideas, 11 (1989), 157–80. 
33 See Q8, §21, 951-3; Q13, §1, 1558–60. 
34 On Gramsci’s changing assessment of Jacobinism, see Marco Gervasoni, Antonio Gramsci e la Francia: 
dal mito della modernità alla “scienza della politica” (Milan, 1998); Medici, Giobbe e Prometeo; Leandro 
de Oliveira Galastri, “Revolução passiva e jacobinismo: uma bifucação da historia,” Filosofia e Educação, 
2/1 (2010). 
35 Q1, §44, 44. 
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so much critical reflection.36 Rather, in a reading that clearly bears the marks of both the 
Bolshevik theorization of hegemony in terms of political relations between the city and 
countryside as well as Machiavelli’s insistence upon the necessity of a “patriotic” militia, 
he focuses in the first instance on the Jacobins as those who “strenuously fought to ensure 
the link between the city and the countryside.”37 The Jacobin’s main achievement is thus 
depicted, with an emphasis that is rare in the historical scholarship,38 not simply in terms 
of the creation of national unity, but in terms of the specific mechanism of its realization, 
                                                        
36 See, for example, Clarence Crane Brinton, The Jacobins: an Essay in the New History (New York, 1930); 
François Furet, “Jacobinism,” in François Furet and Mona Ozouf, eds., Arthur Goldhammer, trans., A Critical 
Dictionary of the French Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1989); Patrice Higonnet, Goodness beyond Virtue. 
Jacobins during the French Revolution (Cambridge/Mass, 1998). 
37 Q1 §44, 42. This was the reason for Gramsci’s affiliation of Machiavelli to a Jacobin tradition avant la 
lettre. “Any formation of a national popular collective will is impossible without the masses of peasant 
farmers entering simultaneously into political life. This is what Machiavelli wanted with the reform of the 
militia, this is what the Jacobins did in the French Revolution, in this consists Machiavelli’s [precocious] 
Jacobinism, the fertile germ of his conception of national revolution” (Q8, §21, 951–2). While much 
Machiavelli scholarship, particularly in the twentieth century, has focused on the Prince or the Discourses to 
the neglect of The Art of War, Gramsci effectively “jacobinizes” his reading of the former texts by means of 
a focus on the political implications of the latter. For a consideration of the centrality of The Art of War in 
Machiavelli’s “political philosophy,” see Filippo Del Lucchese, The Political Philosophy of Niccolò 
Machiavelli (Edinburgh, 2015), 105–13, 120–2. 
38 Exceptions in the scholarship on Jacobinism that stress the importance of their rural policies include 
Anatoli Ado, Paysans en révolution: terre, pouvoir et jacquerie, 1789-1794 (Paris, 1996); Jill Maciak, 
“Learning to Love the Republic: Jacobin Propaganda and the Peasantry of the Haute-Garonne,” European 
Review of History/ Revue européenne d’histoire, 6/2 (1999), 165–79; Henry Heller, The Bourgeois 
Revolution in France (New York, 2006). 
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namely, in the mobilization of the peasantry under the leadership of a predominantly urban 
political movement.39 
Yet Gramsci also highlights the historical limits of Jacobinism. Already in early 
1930 he argues that 
 
The development of Jacobinism (of content) [in France in the early nineteenth 
century] found its formal perfection in the parliamentary regime, which, in 
the period of the greatest abundance of ‘private’ energies in society, realized 
the hegemony of the urban class over the whole population in the Hegelian 
form of government with permanently organized consent […]. The ‘limit’ 
encountered by the Jacobins with the Chapelier law [or the maximum] is 
sublated [superato] and extended [allargato] by means of a complex, 
theoretico-practical (juridico-political = economic) process due to which 
political consent is regained (hegemony is maintained), extending and 
strengthening the economic base through industrial and commercial 
development up to the epoch of imperialism and the world war.40 
                                                        
39 On the importance of peasant mobilization for Gramsci’s understanding of Jacobinism, see Walter L. 
Adamson, Hegemony and Revolution. A Study of Antonio Gramsci’s Political and Cultural Theory 
(Berkeley/London, 1980). Gramsci may have drawn inspiration for this reading from Mathiez, who briefly 
valorizes this dimension of Jacobin politics. See Albert Mathiez, 1920, Le Bolchévisme et le Jacobinisme 
(Paris, 1920). 
40 Q1, §48, 58; see also Q1, §44, 51–2. Superare, here rendered as ‘to sublate’, is the standard Italian 
translation of Hegel’s aufheben, or the dialectical unity of cancellation and preservation. Previous translations 
of this passage have tended to reduce the Hegelian resonance. Hoare and Nowell Smith, translating the 
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Gramsci thus characterizes what could be described as “actually existing” or, in his words, 
“historical Jacobinism,” as a contradictory phenomenon.41 On the one hand, the limited 
class nature of the Jacobin movement had already become apparent in the course of the 
French Revolution, as the Chapelier law of 1791 (under the influence once again of 
Mathiez, Gramsci later adds in the margins: “or the maximum”) saw the bourgeois 
Jacobins turn on their former allies among the popular classes by attempting to limit their 
forms of autonomous political organization and activity. On the other hand, the 
contradictory and hesitant development from the early nineteenth century onwards of 
bourgeois parliamentary regimes and their complementary civil societies sublated 
[superato] and “formally perfected” Jacobinism’s claims to secure national-popular unity. 
                                                        
corresponding formulation in the C text (Q13, §37, 1636: superato e respinto più lontano progressivamente), 
opt for ‘transcended and pushed progressively back’; see Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks, edited and translated Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (New York, 1971). Buttigieg 
and Callari instead render superato e allargato as ‘overcome and slackened’; see Antonio Gramsci, Prison 
Notebooks, Volume 1, ed. Joseph A. Buttigieg, trans. Joseph A. Buttigieg and A. Callari (New York, 1992). 
Both translations seem to me to be misleading. Gramsci’s argument in this note is not that the “class limit” 
of the Jacobins was “transcended” or “overcome” by the parliamentary regime, in the sense of being negated, 
or no longer being operative. On the contrary, this limit not only remained in force during the early nineteenth 
century, but was even strengthened in unprecedented and highly mediated forms, thereby increasing the 
capacity of the bourgeois class to integrate antagonistic social classes within its own political project, within 
and according to its own class limits and interests. 
41 See Q8, §35, 961; see also Q11, §66, 1498. 
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Gramsci’s argument here appears to distinguish between “historical Jacobinism” 
and what André Tosel has efficaciously called a “Metajacobinism”.42 While the Prison 
Notebooks analyses the contradictory transformation of historical Jacobinism from radical 
challenge to the status quo to one of its prime supports, “Metajacobinism” refers to 
Gramsci’s attempt to identify the ways in which a certain “spirit” of Jacobinism was 
“sublated” – that is, both cancelled and preserved – by subsequent political history. Thus, 
Q1, §44 goes on to note that the Jacobins’ “limits” re-appeared in 1848 as an already 
menacing “spectre”: “In Germany, 1848 fails because of the lack of bourgeois 
concentration (the Jacobin type of slogan was provided by Marx during the German 1848: 
‘the revolution in permanence’).”43 This Metajacobinism makes a further appearance in the 
conclusion to this note. The Bolsheviks, Gramsci argues, though not using Marx’s Jacobin 
slogan, nevertheless “employed it in its historical, concrete, living form adapted to the time 
and place as something that sprang from all the pores of the society which had to be 
transformed, as the alliance of two classes with the hegemony of the urban class.”44 
Gramsci’s first notebook and the extensive Q1, §44 were thus originally dedicated 
to the exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of the Jacobin tradition, setting the 
former against the latter in the form of an immanent critique. When passive revolution is 
intermittently deployed in subsequent notebooks, it will effectively be conceived in terms 
                                                        
42 André Tosel, “Gramsci et la Révolution française,” Modernité de Gramsci?, ed. André Tosel (Paris, 1992), 
99. 
43 Q1, §44, 53. 
44 Q1 §44, 54. 
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of a generalization of this “limit” and “formal perfection” of historical Jacobinism, 
constituting a spectral presence that signals the absence of “Metajacobinism”. 
 
Croce’s speculative dialectic and the “absence of popular initiative” (January–May 1932) 
 
Looking forwards, passive revolution is used in later notebooks with a “punctual” rhythm, 
with periods of intense reflection on its possible significance followed by moments of 
relative or complete neglect. Yet it is a punctual rhythm also in the sense that Gramsci’s 
reflections on the possible significance of passive revolution are continually “punctuated” 
by returns to the theme of permanent revolution, conceived as passive revolution’s 
dialectical counterpoint. Three phases of this development can be distinguished, each 
overdetermined by the terms of Gramsci’s engagement with one of his major agonists in 
the Prison Notebooks. 
Before this development begins, however, the formula of passive revolution 
effectively disappears from Gramsci’s vocabulary for over a year after its first occurrence. 
Throughout 1931, Gramsci’s energies are dedicated to the elaboration of the philosophical 
perspectives that will later lead to the novel formulation of Marxism as a “philosophy of 
praxis.” It is only in early 1932 that these philosophical researches are translated into the 
historiographical register in which the implications of passive revolution are initially 
explored. The first phase of this development occurs under the aegis of Gramsci’s critique 
of Croce, and in particular, of Croce’s relation to the legacy of the Risorgimento. It is in 
this phase that Gramsci outlines many of the themes, analogies and formulations that are 
now widely regarded as the “core component elements” of the concept of passive 
 24 
revolution.45 Thus, in January and February 1932, in Notebook 8, he explicates passive 
revolution in terms of the formula of “revolution-restauration,” appropriated from Quinet, 
and the notion of “progressive restaurations.” In the same note, he provides the famous 
characterization of passive revolution as “the absence of popular initiative” and as founded 
upon the partial fulfilment and consequent deformation of popular demands.46 Another 
note in this period compares passive revolution to traditions of “transformism” in the post-
Risorgimento Italian state, while soon after Gramsci explores the formula of “conservation-
innovation,” in a pointed critique of the limits of Croce’s historicism.47 Significantly, in 
the same period Gramsci continues his interest in the tradition of “permanent revolution,” 
defining its “sublation” as “hegemony,” which in turn is equated with the “war of 
position.”48 
Passive revolution remains prominent throughout April and May 1932, though 
Gramsci’s attention now turns more forcefully to contemporary themes. Different styles in 
the formula’s usage can be noted at this point; while before it was used interpretively in 
historical analysis, it now appears to be used as a description of a political strategy or 
technique. He asks whether Fascism might be “the form of ‘passive revolution’ specific to 
the twentieth century, just as liberalism was the form of ‘passive revolution’ specific to the 
                                                        
45 See, for instance, the synthetic definitions offered in Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci and the State, 310–17; 
Morton, Unravelling Gramsci, 63–73; De Smet, Gramsci on Tahir, 37–71; Roccu, “Passive Revolution 
revisited,” 544–46. 
46 Q8, §25, 957. 
47 Q8, §36, 962; Q8, §39, 966. 
48 Q8, §52, 973, February 1932. 
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nineteenth century.”49 He specifies that the interrogative could be affirmed in the following 
terms: 
 
Passive revolution would consist in the fact of transforming the economic 
structure “reformistically”, from an individualistic economy to a planned 
economy (administered economy) [economia secondo un piano (economia 
diretta)] and the emergence of an “intermediate economy”, one between a 
purely individualistic one and a planned one in the strict sense, allowing the 
transition to more advanced political and cultural forms without radical and 
annihilating destructive cataclysms. “Corporativism” could be or could 
become, as it develops, this intermediate economy of a “passive” character.50 
 
This conception (that is, passive revolution considered as corporativism, rather than passive 
revolution as such), Gramsci continues to argue, “could be related to that which in politics 
is called the ‘war of position’, as opposed to the war of movement.” 
The center of the research in April–May 1932, however, is found in Gramsci’s 
introductory summary to the first part of Notebook 10. This summary outlines in a synthetic 
way the themes that he will unfold in the following months and into the next year. He notes 
                                                        
49 Q8, §236, 1089. 
50 Q8, §236, 1089; see also, from the same period, Q10I, §9, 1226–9, in which these themes are specified in 
terms of the intersection of colonialism, imperialist rivalries and domestic class struggle in recent Italian 
history, with a particular focus on the role played by Fascism in stabilizing relations between the traditional 
ruling class and the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie. 
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the process by means of which Cuoco’s formula passed from historical reflection to a 
“formula for ‘action’,” a “‘speculative’ dialectic of history” comparable to Proudhon, a 
“dialectic of the ‘intellectuals’ who conceive of themselves as embodying the thesis and 
antithesis and thus as elaborators of the synthesis.”51 Just as significantly, he questions 
whether Italy might have the same relationship to the USSR that Kant and Hegel’s 
Germany had to Robespierre and Napoleon’s France.52 Passive revolution in this phase 
takes on the features of a speculative reflection on and above history, an active form of 
neutralization that Gramsci argues to be at work in Croce’s historiographical strategy of 
commencing his histories of Europe and Italy post festum.53 
At the same time, Gramsci continues during these months his exploration of 
permanent revolution, once again argued to be actualized in the notion of hegemony.54 It 
is a theme that he explores in greater historical depth in a series of five dense notes 
transcribed and revised throughout the second half of 1932 and 1933, in the “special” 
notebook 13 dedicated to Machiavelli and the modern Prince.55 It is significant that during 
this period (late 1932–early 1933) Gramsci’s research on passive revolution is effectively 
put on hold, as permanent revolution, viewed through the lens of Machiavelli, becomes the 
focus of his energies. 
                                                        
51 Q10I, “Summary”, 6, 1208, April–May 1932; see Q10I, §6, 1219-22, April–May 1932; Q9, §97, 1160–
1, May 1932; Q10II, §41xiv, 1324–7, August-December 1932. 
52 Q10I,’Summary’, 9, 1209; see also Q10II, §61, 1358–62, February–May 1933. 
53 Q8, §240, 1091, May 1932. 
54 Q10I, §12, 1234–5, April-May 1932. 




From Machiavelli to Marx: the “necessary critical corollary” of the 1859 “Preface” 
(March–July 1933) 
 
It is therefore perhaps not coincidental that it is in a series of notes all entitled 
“Machiavelli,” written between March and May in 1933, that Gramsci returns to explore 
the ‘limits’ of passive revolution, as an historical process and theoretical concept.56 The 
rubric of “Machiavelli” in this sense functions as both a point of condensation of the lines 
of research on passive and permanent revolution, and as the moment of transition between 
them. In March-April 1933, Gramsci revisits the previously delineated notion of a war of 
position. Might there be, he asks, “an absolute identity between war of position and passive 
revolution? Or at least does there exist or can there be an entire historical period in which 
the two concepts have to be identified, until war of position becomes again war of 
movement?.”57 Gramsci here explores this hypothesis in relation to the development of the 
Italian Risorgimento, in which “molecular modifications … progressively modify the 
previous composition of forces and thus become the matrix of new modifications.”58 Very 
soon after, however, in April–May 1933, the conjugation of Machiavelli, passive 
                                                        
56 Q15, §11, 1766, March–April 1933; Q15, §15, 1772, April–May 1933; Q15, §17, 1774, April–May 1933; 
Q15, §25, 1781, May 1933. 
57 Q15, §11, 1766–7. This line of research is continued between April and July 1933 in Q15, §15, 1772; Q15, 
§25, 1781; Q15, §56, 1818–19; Q15, §59, 1822–4 (the “Piedmont function”: “dictatorship without 
hegemony”), culminating in Q15, §62, 1827. 
58 Q15, §11, 1767. 
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revolution and a novel reflection on Marx’s 1859 “Preface” leads to a new approach to the 
problem. Passive revolution is no longer considered primarily in historiographical terms, 
but instead, as a way of thinking the forms in which political action is possible (or not) in 
Gramsci’s contemporary condition. 
Gramsci had translated passages from Marx’s 1859 “Preface” perhaps as early as 
May 1930.59 He repeatedly recalled some of its most pregnant formulations throughout the 
development of the Prison Notebooks, treating them almost as axioms for research into 
both the political history of the nineteenth century and the internal coherence of the 
materialist conception of history.60 Both of these lines of research are continued in the 
Spring and Summer of 1933, but with a decisive difference: now, Gramsci is less interested 
in the axiomatic status of the “Preface” than in the conclusion that could be drawn from it. 
He argues that “the concept of passive revolution must be deduced rigorously from two 
fundamental principles of political science,” namely,  
 
1) that no social formation disappears as long as the productive forces which 
have developed within it still find room for their further progressive 
                                                        
59 On the dating of this translation, see Gianni Francioni, “Nota al testo,” in Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del 
carcere, I, Quaderni di traduzione (1929-1932), eds. Giuseppe Cospito and Gianni Francioni (Rome, 2007), 
870–90. 
60 See, for example, Q4, §38, 455–65, October 1930; Q7, §4, 855, November 1930; Q7, §20, 869, November 
1930–February 1931; Q8, §195, 1057–8, February 1932; Q10II, §6, 1244–5, May 1932; Q11, §22, 1422–6, 
July–August 1932; Q13, §17, 1578–89, May 1932–November 1933; Q13, §18, 1589–97, May 1932–
November 1933. 
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movement; 2) that society does not set itself tasks for whose solution the 
necessary conditions have not already been incubated [covate] etc.61 
 
As he immediately specifies in the same note, the concept of passive revolution can 
be “deduced” from these principles only if they are first “cleansed of every trace of 
mechanicism and fatalism.” Cuoco’s formulation is thereby “completely modified and 
enriched,” not as a “programme,” as Gramsci clarifies later in a note from June-July 1933, 
but as a “criterion of interpretation” in the absence of other active elements. Passive 
revolution in this usage can have a concrete political sense only if it “assumes, or postulates 
as necessary, a vigorous antithesis,” which autonomously and intransigently sets all its 
forces in motion.62 
It can thus appear that in the Spring and Summer of 1933 Gramsci’s reflections on 
passive revolution culminate in a decidedly voluntarist turn. Against a tendency towards 
objective determinism that seems to be embodied in the 1859 “Preface,” the potentially 
equally “fatalist” notion of passive revolution appears to be called upon, paradoxically, to 
affirm the primacy of subjective force. This reading, however, would neglect an additional 
crucial development that Gramsci undertakes in the Summer of 1933, in the conclusion to 
Q15, §62. Here, he no longer “deduces” passive revolution from the axioms of the 1859 
“Preface,” but instead redefines passive revolution as its “necessary critical corollary,” or 
as a conclusion that retroacts upon its premises in the form of a critical modification.63 This 
                                                        
61 Q15, §17, 1774, April–May 1933. 
62 Q15, §62, 1827, June–July 1933. 
63 Q15, §62, 1827. 
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focus, in its turn, refers back to what Gramsci had earlier characterized in October 1930, 
before his research on passive revolution began, as the “dialectical mediation” of the two 
fundamental principles of the text of 1859: namely, the concept of “permanent 
revolution.”64 
 
Permanent Revolution in the Prison Notebooks 
 
The notion of permanent revolution is today almost invariably identified with the positions 
developed by Trotsky from 1905 onwards, their transformation in the debates in the 1920s 
in opposition to the theory of “socialism in one country”, and their extension throughout 
the 1930s in relation to Trotsky’s theory of uneven and combined development.65 For this 
tradition, permanent revolution primarily signifies the continuity of the revolutionary 
process, and a profound critique of the notion of temporal stagism. In the Prison Notebooks, 
Gramsci (in)famously criticizes both this conception of permanent revolution, and Trotsky 
himself. Yet at the same time, Gramsci also valorizes permanent revolution as the 
foundation of the theory of hegemony in a series of notes that have seemed to many readers 
to be contradictory or enigmatic, when not simply perplexing or mistaken.66 
                                                        
64 Q4, §38, 456–7. 
65 For a classic account of this development, see Michael Löwy, The Politics of Combined and Uneven 
Development: The Theory of Permanent Revolution (London, 1981). 
66 See, for instance, Neil Davidson, How Revolutionary were the Bourgeois Revolutions? (Chicago, 2012), 
279; Emanuele Saccarelli, Gramsci and Trotsky in the Shadow of Stalinism. The Political Theory and 
Practice of Opposition (New York, 2007). 
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Critical discussion of this seeming paradox has frequently focused on explaining 
how Gramsci’s general assessment of Trotsky was compromised by a series of 
misattributions and conflations. 67  It is undoubtable that Gramsci’s often dismissive 
engagement with Trotsky in the Prison Notebooks stands in significant discontinuity with 
his previously critical appreciation of Trotsky’s strengths and weaknesses, particularly in 
the immediate aftermath of his sojourn in Russia in 1922-23.68 Gramsci seems to have been 
strongly influenced by the general terms of debate established during the so-called “literary 
discussion” that began in late 1924 (following the publication of Trotsky’s Lessons of 
October), and possibly by Bukharin’s distinctive contributions to it in particular. 69 
Similarly, it appears that on more than one occasion throughout the 1920s Gramsci risked 
                                                        
67 A comprehensive assessment of these limitations is provided by Frank Rosengarten, “The Gramsci-Trotsky 
Question (1922–1932),” Social Text, 11 (1984–5), 65–95. 
68 For a study of the terms of the transformation of Gramsci’s judgment of Trotsky’s positions in the Russian 
party and in the Communist International, see Irina V. Grigoreva, “Gramsci e le lotte all’interno del PCUS 
(1923-1926),” Gramsci e il Novecento, Volume 1 (Rome, 1999). 
69 On Gramsci’s relation to Bukharin’s positions throughout the early and mid 1920s, see Leonardo Paggi, 
Le strategie del potere in Gramsci. Tra fascismo e socialismo in un solo paese 1923–26 (Rome, 1984). 
Bukharin’s contributions to the literary discussion are available in Frederick C. Corney, ed., Trotsky’s 
Challenge. The ‘Literary Discussion’ of 1924 and the Fight for the Bolshevik Revolution (Leiden, 2016), 
147–62, 514–54, 555–69. ‘The Theory of Permanent Revolution’ (28 December 1924) in particular was an 
influential text, widely translated and discussed in the international Communist movement. Echoes of this 
text’s reading of permanent revolution’s meaning in 1848 arguably can be found in Gramsci’s later 
reflections. 
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ascribing to Trotsky the positions and orientations of Bordiga. 70  By analyzing these 
contextual and polemical overdeterminations, such an approach attempts to open the way 
to a more substantial reconsideration of potential affinities between Gramsci and Trotsky’s 
thought, including in terms of their theories of permanent revolution.71 
What this approach tends to occlude, however, is the extent to which Gramsci’s 
criticisms of Trotsky’s understanding of permanent revolution, whether legitimate or 
polemically distorted, were accompanied by a distinct understanding of the meaning of 
permanent revolution in its formulation by Marx and Engels in the late 1840s. Clarifying 
this meaning was in fact Gramsci’s primary concern, and his critique of Trotsky was largely 
subordinate to it. Rather than defending Trotsky against Gramsci’s criticisms, or focusing 
on the possible reasons for their polemical distortions, it is thus more significant for the 
purpose of the current study to consider the nature of Gramsci’s distinct understanding of 
permanent revolution, the plausibility of its claimed inheritance of Marx and Engels’ 
                                                        
70 The notion of an affinity between, if not equation of, Trotsky and Bordiga effectively constituted the lens 
through which Gramsci read the emerging factional struggle in the Russian party throughout 1924 and 1925. 
See, for instance, Antonio Gramsci, La costruzione del Partito comunista 1923-1926 (Turin, 1971), 459–62. 
For analyses of this conjuncture, see Giovanni Somai, “Sul rapporto tra Trockij, Gramsci e Bordiga (1922–
1926),” Storia contemporanea, 1 (1982), 73–98; Silvio Pons, “Il gruppo dirigente del PCI e la ‘questione 
russa’ (1924-26),” Gramsci nel suo tempo, Volume 1, ed. Francesco Giasi (Rome, 2008). 
71 Different readings in this sense are offered by Bianchi, O laboratório de Gramsci, 199–252; De Smet, 
Gramsci on Tahrir; Dal Maso, El marxismo de Gramsci. I have previously explored the Gramsci–Trotsky 
relationship in related terms in Peter D. Thomas, “Uneven Developments, Combined: The First World War 
and Marxist Theories of Revolution,” Cataclysm 1914: The First World War in the Making of Modern World 
Politics, ed. Alex Anievas (Leiden, 2015). 
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slogan, and its dialectical relation to the use of passive revolution throughout the Prison 
Notebooks. 
 
“The alliance of two classes with the hegemony of the urban class” (February–March 
1930) 
 
As previously highlighted, the first note in which Gramsci discusses the concept of 
hegemony in the Prison Notebooks, and to which he only later adds the concept of passive 
revolution, concludes with a discussion of permanent revolution and a critique of what 
Gramsci took to be Trotsky’s [‘Bronstein’] version of it. In February–March 1930, he 
argues that 
 
As regards the “Jacobin” slogan which Marx directed at the Germany of 
1848-9, its complex fortunes should be examined. Revived, systematized, 
elaborated, intellectualized by the Parvus-Bronstein group, it proved inert and 
ineffective in 1905, and afterward: it was an abstract thing that belonged to 
the scientific laboratory. The tendency which opposed it in this 
intellectualized form, however, without using it “intentionally,” in fact 
employed it in its historical, concrete, living form adapted to the time and 
place as something that sprang from all the pores of the society which had to 
be transformed, as the alliance of two classes with the hegemony of the urban 
class. 
In the one case, a Jacobin temperament without the adequate political 
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content, typified by Crispi; in the second case, a Jacobin temperament and 
content in keeping with the new historical relations, rather than adhering to 
an intellectualistic label.72 
 
In this passage, Gramsci questions Trotsky’s understanding of Marx and Engels’ references 
to permanent revolution in their historical context in the 1840s, suggesting that only if this 
were adequately grasped would it be possible to undertake a coherent “actualization” of 
their slogan. Even more significantly, Gramsci provides an interpretation of this slogan that 
cannot easily be reconciled with the temporal metaphors by means of which permanent 
revolution has usually been conceptualized. Rather than synonymous with the temporal 
metaphors of “uninterrupted,” “compressed,” “telescoped” or “continuous” development,73 
                                                        
72 Q1, §44, 54. 
73 Both Knei-Paz and Day and Gaido emphasize that the terms “permanent revolution” [permanentnaya 
revolyutsiya] and “uninterrupted revolution” [niepreryvnaya revolyutsiya] were used synonymously in the 
debates in Russian social democracy in the early twentieth century, from which Trotsky’s formulation 
derives. See Baruch Knei-Paz, The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky (Oxford, 1979), 152; 
Richard Day and Daniel Gaido (eds.), Witnesses to Permanent Revolution: The Documentary Record 
(Leiden, 2009), 449–50. Larsson argues that the term implies a conception of “compressed” development: 
Reidar Larsson, Theories of Revolution: From Marx to the First Russian Revolution (Stockholm, 1970), 31; 
while Draper uses the term “telescoping” in relation to Engels’s assessment of Germany in the Vormärz: Hal 
Draper, Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution, Volume II: The Politics of Social Classes (New York, 1978), 175. 
Löwy concedes that the text of Marx and Engels contain both “stagist” and “permanentist” concepts of 
permanent revolution, but argues that it is ultimately a conception of continuous, “uninterrupted and 
combined revolution” that constitutes their decisive innovation: Löwy, The Politics of Combined and Uneven 
Development, 3, 9. 
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Gramsci instead suggests that the “permanence” of the revolutionary movement should be 
understood in quite different theoretical vocabularies: either in terms of emergence, or the 
realization of a previously latent dimension (“something that sprang from all the pores of 
the society that had to be transformed”), or in terms of (re)articulation, or the relational 
transformation of previously given elements (an “alliance of two classes with the 
hegemony of the urban class”). Most intriguingly, Gramsci asserts that these are the 
dimensions that constitute the “historical, concrete, living form” of permanent revolution, 
almost as if this were a self-evident interpretation of Marx’s “Jacobin” slogan in the late 
1840s. 
 
Excursus: the “Revolution in Permanence” in Marx and Engels (1848–1850) 
 
Gramsci here appears to be drawing upon a tradition of understanding of the role of 
permanent revolution in Marx and Engels’s thought that is distinct from the temporal 
emphasis that emerged during the debates of Russian social democracy in the early 
twentieth century, and has since constituted the dominant paradigm of interpretation.74 In 
the case of Marx and Engels’s specific usage of the formula (and its variant forms), this 
approach has also tended to assume a uniformity of meaning in terms of a continuous or 
uninterrupted revolutionary process, both before and after 1848.75 What this perspective 
                                                        
74 See Day and Gaido (eds.), Witnesses to Permanent Revolution; Lars Lih, Lars “Democratic Revolution in 
Permanenz,” Science & Society, 76/4 (2012), 433–62. 
75 See, for example., Löwy, The Politics of Combined and Uneven Development; Stathis Kouvelakis, “Marx’s 
Critique of the Political. From the Revolutions of 1848 to the Paris Commune,” Situations, 2/2 (2007), 81; 
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downplays is the polyvalence of the formula in Marx and Engels’s texts throughout the 
1840s, and particularly following the defeats of the revolutionary forces in 1848-9. In the 
early 1840s, “permanent revolution” is most often invoked in their writings in a negative 
sense, as a critique of the limitations of the temporality of bourgeois “politicism.”76 
In 1850, however, in their March “Address of the Central Committee to the 
Communist League,” Marx and Engels elaborate a perspective that is more strongly 
institutional in its focus. 77  Rather than an extension of the theme of the continual 
revolutionizing of the capitalist mode of production from the Communist Manifesto, as has 
often been thought,78 their use of “the Revolution in Permanence” [die Revolution in 
Permanenz] in this context was effectively an act self-critique by means of the 
                                                        
Fabio Frosini, Da Gramsci a Marx (Rome, 2009), 32; Erik van Ree, “Marxism as Permanent Revolution,” 
History of Political Thought, XXXIV/3 (2013), 540–63. 
76 See, for instance, Marx’s critique of the Jacobins in On the Jewish Question, or his related critique of 
Napoleon in The Holy Family: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works (London, 1975-2005), 
Volume 3, 155–6; Volume 4, 123. 
77 Marx and Engels, Collected Works, Volume 10, 281–7. For a similar usage in the same period, in The 
Class Struggle in France, see Marx and Engels, Collected Works, Volume 10, 127: “Communism … is the 
declaration of the permanence of the revolution, the class dictatorship of the proletariat as the necessary 
transit point to the abolition of class distinctions generally….” 
78  For the classical formulation of this argument, see Löwy, The Politics of Combined and Uneven 
Development. For an argument that a distinct notion of permanent revolution only emerged retrospectively 
and interpretively, “in the gap between the historical and the political registers of the Manifesto” that opened 
up after 1848, see Emanuele Saccarelli, “The Permanent Revolution in and around the Manifesto,” The 
Cambridge Companion to The Communist Manifesto, eds. Terrell Carver and James Farr (Cambridge, 2015), 
110. 
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appropriation of the slogan (and arguably also programme) of an erstwhile rival. For it was 
Andreas Gottschalk, Marx’s antagonist in the Cologne workers’ movement, who had 
earlier proposed this slogan – ironically, in a text in which Gottschalk denounced Marx for 
a lack of genuinely revolutionary commitment and an insufficiently radical critique of 
(bourgeois) democracy.79 “The Revolution in Permanence” in this sense invokes the notion 
of “permanence” as “self-determination,” a sense that was notably present in the French 
revolutionary process in the 1790s and remains operative in technical constitutional-
juridical vocabularies of at least some Western European languages, if not in English.80 In 
                                                        
79 “An Herrn Karl Marx, Redakteur der Neuen Rheinischen Zeitung,” Freiheit, Arbeit, No. 13 (Cologne, 25 
February 1849), reprinted in Freiheit, Arbeit. Organ des Kölner Arbeitervereins (Glashüttem im Taunus, 
1972). For two opposing views of the implications of Marx and Engels’s conjunctural appropriation (already 
in 1849) of Gottschalk’s slogan and programme of independent working class political representation, see 
Jonathan Sperber, Karl Marx: A Nineteenth-Century Life (New York, 2013), 251–2, and Lars Lih, “What did 
Marx mean by ‘Revolution in Permanenz’?,” Historical Materialism, forthcoming. Stedman Jones neglects 
these contextualist determinations, and consequently reproposes an older notion (now discredited, because 
lacking in textual evidence) that the March 1850 Address represented a “Blanquist” aberration before Marx 
definitively returned to the conception of “stages” that had supposedly marked The Communist Manifesto. 
See Gareth Stedman Jones, “The Young Hegelians, Marx and Engels,” The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-
Century Political Thought, eds. Gareth Stedman Jones and Gregory Claeys (Cambridge, 2011), 556–600, at 
581; Gareth Stedman Jones, Karl Marx. Greatness and Illusion (London, 2016). 
80 On the difficulties of translating the formulation “Die Revolution in Permanenz” into English, see Draper, 
Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution, Volume II: The Politics of Social Classes, 169–263, 591–5, 599–612. In 
Marx and Engels’s (and Gottschalk’s) usage, “in Permanenz” is a simple German calque of the French “en 
permanence.” In constitutional-juridical terms, it refers not to a temporally continuous session of an assembly 
(that is, permanence in the sense of temporal endurance), but rather, to that assembly’s constitutional power 
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the French revolutionary process, from the Tennis Court Oath of 1789 refusing to disperse 
the assembled Third Estate, to the combative declarations of the Parisian sectional 
assemblies, particularly in 1793, that they would remain sitting “in permanence” [en 
permanence], the phrase was used to signify the intention to remain constituted as a 
politically active public body, rather than reduced to a condition of “passive” citizenship.81 
Read in the light of this tradition, and in the context of the sectarian debates of the defeated 
revolutionary forces after 1848, Marx and Engels’s invocation of the “permanence” of the 
revolution in March 1850 does not refer to a temporally uninterrupted process, but rather, 
to the potential organizational autonomy and self-constitution of the working class 
movement as an explicitly political (rather than merely social) force. This usage of “The 
Revolution in Permanence” could thus be translated as “the working class movement’s 
political and institutional autonomy”. 
It was in these terms that Lenin later, in 1905, understood the March 1850 
“Address.” Responding to Plekhanov’s explicit invocation of a stagist schema, Lenin did 
                                                        
to determine the duration and modality of its own sessions, without exterior (in particular, executive) 
interference. Regarding the meaning of the term in French constitutional law, see Léon Duguit, Traité de 
droit constitutionnel, tome IV (Paris, 1924), 234–5. 
81 On declarations of “permanence” in the early 1790s, particularly by the sectional assemblies, see Albert 
Soboul, The French Revolution 1787–1799, translated by Alan Forrest and Colin Jones (London, 1974), 382–
3; Albert Soboul, The Sans-Culottes, trans. Rémy Inglis Hall (Princeton, 1980), 118–27; Micah Alpaug, Non-
Violence and the French Revolution: Political Demonstrations in Paris 1787–1795 (Cambridge, 2015), 83. 
On resistance to the imposition of passive citizenship, see William Sewell, “Le Citoyen/la Citoyenne: 
Activity, Passivity, and the Revolutionary Concept of Citizenship,” The Political Culture of the French 
Revolution, ed. Colin Lucas (Oxford, 1988). 
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not argue, surprisingly, in similarly temporal terms. Rather, he asserted that “Marx’s idea 
[in the ‘Address’] consists in the following”: 
 
We, the German Social-Democrats of 1850, are unorganized, we were 
defeated in the first period of the revolution and were taken completely in tow 
by the bourgeoisie; we must organize independently – absolutely and under 
all circumstances independently…82 
 
It is, finally, this emphasis upon the autonomous political organization that Gramsci will 
later argue was “sublated,” following 1848 and in even more intense forms after 1870, in 
the theory and practice of hegemony. For the capacity of the working class movement to 
provide leadership (that is, hegemony) to other social strata (above all the peasantry) 
presupposed the prior achievement of its political and organizational independence. It was 
in this precise sense that Gramsci argued that the hegemonic politics pursued by the 
Bolsheviks before but above all after the 1917 revolution could be conceived as an 
“actualization” of the slogan of the “Revolution in Permanence.” 
 
“Dialectical Mediation” (October 1930) 
 
After its first appearance in early 1930, Gramsci’s conception of the “actualization” of 
permanent revolution traverses the entirety of the Prison Notebooks, “punctuating” or 
                                                        
82 Lenin, “Plekhanov’s Reference to History,” Lenin Collected Works, Volume 8 (Moscow, 1962), 463–73, 
at 470. 
 40 
interrupting his reflections on passive revolution. An important initial moment in this 
development occurs in Gramsci’s first series of notes on philosophy from late 1930, in 
Notebook 4, where he posits permanent revolution as the “dialectical mediation” of the two 
fundamental principles of Marx’s 1859 “Preface.”83 This note is written in October 1930 – 
that is, a month before he first refers to Cuoco’s formula of passive revolution (in 
November 1930),84 and almost three years before he characterizes passive revolution as the 
“critical corollary” of Marx’s text (in June–July 1933).85 Entitled “Relations of Structure 
and Superstructures,” this lengthy note constitutes a first sketch of central themes that will 
later be developed more extensively throughout the Prison Notebooks, including the 
fundamental analysis of the three moments of relations of force and the “gnoseological” 
value of Marx’s affirmation of the superstructures. 
The note departs from observations regarding the “canons of historical 
methodology” that can be derived from the “two principles” of the “Preface,” namely, that 
“no society poses itself tasks for whose solution there do not already exist the necessary 
and sufficient conditions,” and that a “society does not fall if it has not first developed all 
the forms of life that are implicit in its relations.”86 Gramsci distinguishes between what is 
“permanent” and “occasional” in any given social structure; while the “permanent” 
                                                        
83 Q4, §38, 456-7, October 1930. 
84 Q4, §57, 504, November 1930. 
85 Q15, §62, 1827, June–July 1933. 
86 As Gramsci here inverts the order of propositions in Marx’s “Preface,” emphasizing the need to check the 
“exact formulation” of these principles, this note was most likely written before he had finalized his 
translation of Marx’s text. See the the order and wording of propositions in the C Text: Q13, §17, 1579, May 
1932–November 1933. 
 41 
establishes the general conditions of possibility of social transformation (or conservation), 
it is the “occasional” that interests Gramsci in particular, as the attempt by different social 
groups to demonstrate that there already exist the “necessary conditions” for resolving 
historically determined problems. The legacy of the French Revolution is invoked as a 
concrete case study; it is by studying the oscillating waves of political development 
between 1789 and 1870, Gramsci suggests, that it would be possible to determinate more 
accurately the relations between structure and superstructure, as well as permanent and 
occasional elements of the structure. Mediating between the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of transformation (occasional) and the implicit forms of life of the existing 
social organization (permanent) is the “concept of permanent revolution.”87  This note 
registers the theoretical importance of permanent revolution, but Gramsci does not at this 
stage outline in greater detail the historical perspective that informs this valorization. 
 
“Sublation” and “Actualization” (February–May 1932) 
 
Just as passive revolution does not appear to have been among Gramsci’s primary concerns 
during 1931, so permanent revolution also does not return until early 1932, as a parallel 
track running alongside (in temporal terms) the notes in which many of the now “classical” 
features of passive revolution are elaborated. In this new season of studies, Gramsci 
continues to define the temporal dimensions of permanent revolution not in terms of an 
uninterrupted process, but in terms of an historical “discontinuous continuity.” In a first 
moment in February 1932, he seems to consign permanent revolution to a previous epoch, 
                                                        
87 Q4, §38, 456–7. 
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emphasizing the very different political conditions that marked the slogan’s deployment in 
the 1840s in comparison to those obtaining in the early twentieth centuries. Permanent 
revolution is characterized as “scientific expression of Jacobinism in a period in which 
large political parties and economic trade unions had not yet been constituted.”88 While 
permanent revolution is here equated with “war of movement,” hegemony is identified 
with the “war of position,” as a response to the constitution of the “‘trenches’ and 
permanent fortifications” represented by the large popular organizations of modern 
politics. 89  Yet Gramsci also argues in this same note that the “political concept” of 
permanent revolution from 1848 was not simply replaced by that of hegemony, just as little 
as war of position represents a simple antinomic negation of war of movement. Rather, 
after 1848, permanent revolution was “formulated and sublated” [composto e superato] in 
the concept of “civil hegemony.”90 
The notion of hegemony as a “sublation” of permanent revolution becomes 
increasingly important while Gramsci is undertaking his first steps towards a theoretical 
generalization and contemporary application of passive revolution in April-May 1932, the 
months in which he begins to consider the latter formula’s utility for the analysis of 
Fascism. In particular, this dialectical movement takes the form of the notion of a sublating 
                                                        
88 Q8, §52, 972–3, February 1932. 
89 Q8, §52, 973. 
90 Q8, §52, 973. Once again, previous translations of superato do not seem to me to emphasize adequately 
the Hegelian and dialectical dimensions of Gramsci’s argument. See Gramsci, Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks (Hoare and Nowell Smith), 243: “transcended”; Gramsci, Prison Notebooks (Buttigieg), 267: 
“superseded.” 
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actualization of permanent revolution, its simultaneous transformation and preservation, or 
rather, its preservation by means of transformation. “The greatest modern theoretician of 
the philosophy of praxis” [i.e., Lenin], he argues, 
 
on the terrain of political struggle and organization and with a political 
terminology – in opposition to the various ‘economistic’ tendencies – revalued 
the front of cultural struggle and constructed the doctrine of hegemony as a 
complement to the theory of the State-as-force, and as the actual form of the 
Forty-Eightist doctrine of ‘permanent revolution’.91 
 
Machiavelli and the Expansion of the Political (May 1932–November 1933) 
 
Throughout the rest of 1932 and 1933, Gramsci transcribes into a new notebook five older 
notes in which the reference to permanent revolution plays an important role.92 They are 
all more or less extensive revisions of notes written just a few months before, as Gramsci 
sets about reorganizing his researches in the new optic opened up by the figure of the 
“modern Prince.”93 Interestingly, these notes emphasize the importance of the concept of 
                                                        
91 Q10I, §12, 1235, mid April–mid May 1932; see Q13, §18, 1595–6, May 1932–November 1933. 
92 Q13, §7, 1565–7; Q13, §17, 1578–89; Q13, §18, 1589–97; Q13, §27, 1619–22; Q13, §37, 1635–50; all 
from May 1932–November 1933. 
93 On the emergence of the figure of the modern Prince as a decisive reorganization of Gramsci’s research in 
1932, see Fabio Frosini, “Luigi Russo e Georges Sorel: sulla genesi del ‘moderno Principe’ nei Quaderni del 
carcere di Antonio Gramsci,” Studi storici, 54 (2013), 545–89, and Peter D. Thomas, “The Modern Prince: 
Gramsci’s Reading of Machiavelli,” History of Political Thought, XXXVIII/3 (2017), 523–44. 
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permanent revolution for understanding what is usually taken to be the “classic” terrain of 
passive revolution: the “long nineteenth century” from 1789 to 1870, conceived as a 
reaction to the propulsive force of the French Revolution.94 If Gramsci’s notes highlighting 
passive revolution in the Spring of 1932 had depicted the nineteenth century as an epoch 
of the progressive reduction of the space for political activity by the subaltern classes (the 
“perfection” of the parliamentary regime and consolidation of a “permanently organized 
consent” of Hegelian dimensions), these notes on permanent revolution only a few months 
later instead conceive the same historical period, particularly following 1848, as an 
expansion of the political field, now more complex and institutionally mediated. It was this 
process, Gramsci argues, that gave rise to the elaboration and sublation of the Jacobin 
slogan in the new formula of hegemony: 
 
in the period after 1870, with the colonial expansion of Europe, all these 
elements change. The internal and international organizational relations of the 
State become more complex and massive, and the Forty-Eightist formula of the 
“permanent revolution” is elaborated and sublated [elaborata e superata] in 
political science in the formula of “civil hegemony”.95 
                                                        
94 Similarly, while often associated with passive revolution, Gramsci analysis of “Caesarism” is in fact 
elaborated in notes that focus upon permanent revolution. See Q9, §133, 1194–5, November 1932; Q13, §27, 
1619–22, May 1932–November 1933. 
95 Q13, § 7, 1566, May 1932–November 1933. See the A text: Q8, §52, 973, February 1932. The increasing 
complexity of Gramsci’s historical analysis of the nineteenth century in notes drafted in late 1932 can also 
be observed in Q9, §133, 1195, November 1932. 
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These developments also feed into other significant revisions and specifications in 
notebook 13, in the same period in which Gramsci is articulating passive revolution with 
his reflections on the 1859 Preface (from April-July 1933, in notebook 15). Perhaps the 
most notable of these is Q13, §37, in which there is a maturation of the contraposition of 
“historical Jacobinism” and what I have characterized as “Metajacobinism” from early 
1930. By late 1932 or 1933, Gramsci is able further to specify his assessment of historical 
Jacobinism. The formula of permanent revolution “realized [attuata] in the active phase of 
the French revolution” in the 1790s is clearly distinguished from the “sublated” form of 
permanent revolution that constitutes the tradition of “Metajacobinism” after 1848, and 
which issues in the new formula of hegemony.96 
 
A Dialectic without Synthesis (1934-1935) 
 
Passive revolution returns to prominence in the final years of Gramsci’s active composition 
of the Prison Notebooks (terminated in 1935 due to declining health). This includes a 
hesitant extension of the formula to the analysis of the contemporary phenomena of 
“Americanism and Fordism” in one single note from the second half of 1934.97 This usage 
is formally similar, in both its analogical method and tentativeness, to Gramsci’s earlier 
                                                        
96 Q13, §37, 1636. This distinction is not noted by Bull, who thus ends up collapsing the narratives of two 
distinct historical periods into one generic concept. See Malcolm Bull, “Levelling Out,” New Left Review 
II/70 (July–August 2011), 5–24 at 21. 
97 Q22, §1, 2140. 
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suggestion in the Spring of 1932 that passive revolution may constitute a useful perspective 
for the analysis of Fascism.98 In late 1934 or early 1935, in Notebook 19, however, Gramsci 
turns to the transcription and revision of the “foundational” Q1, §44, the note in which he 
has first developed his reflections on permanent revolution and, later, also passive 
revolution.99 The journey through the Prison Notebooks has witnessed a specification of 
the historical references and narratives associated with each formulation. Just as crucially, 
however, the variation in their usage has also produced a theoretical clarification of their 
necessarily dialectical relation, with each formulation constituting the lens through which 
the strategic import of the other can be comprehended. If passive revolution seems by early 
1935 to be used more precisely to characterize the historical origins of the challenges 
confronting the anti-Fascist movement in the early 1930s, permanent revolution is 
conceived in even clearer terms as its direct antithesis: the “historical, concrete, living 





Contrary to an influential interpretative tradition, I have argued that passive revolution 
should not be understood only or even primarily as a foundational concept for a historical 
                                                        
98 Q8, §236, 1089. 
99 Q19, §24, 2010–34, July–August 1934–February 1935. 
100 Compare the consistency of this metaphor over the five or more years that separate Q1, §44, 54 and Q19, 
§24, 2034. 
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narrative of state development and transformation. Rather, in the first instance, it should 
be comprehended in terms of its heuristic role in the lexical architecture of the Prison 
Notebooks. Focusing on this heuristic role enables us to see more clearly the fundamentally 
strategic concerns that informed Gramsci’s different uses of the formula. Passive 
revolution is deployed as an element in Gramsci’s search for an adequate political strategy 
for the international Communist movement in the 1930s, in close relation to his 
fundamental project of reflecting on the possible actualization of permanent revolution. 
Throughout the Prison Notebooks, passive revolution remains overdetermined by and 
functional to this larger project. 
In one of its most significant usages, the formula of passive revolution provides 
Gramsci with a way of distinguishing between the historical experience of Jacobinism in 
the French revolutionary process and “Metajacobinism,” as a critical inheritance of its 
strengths in the changed circumstances of 1848 and its aftermath. It also enables him to 
explain the conditions under which the “metajacobin” slogan of the “revolution in 
permanence” from 1848 was transformed – “sublated” – into the theory and practice of 
hegemony. Similarly, the primacy of Gramsci’s contemporaneous exploration of 
permanent revolution allows him to specify the utility of passive revolution, not as a 
theoretical end in itself, but as a diagnosis of the challenges confronting the attempt to 
renew the revolution in permanence in the changed political conditions of the struggle 
against Fascism. 
The contemporary discussion of passive revolution in terms of concepts of 
“revolution from above”, theories of state formation and modernization, techniques of 
statecraft and governmentality, and the analysis of current political dynamics has 
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considerably extended the formula’s fields of relevance beyond its original uses in the 
Prison Notebooks. Giving more attention to the heuristic role that passive revolution plays 
within Gramsci’s original project, and the dialectic with permanent revolution that defines 
his use of it, offers to recover not only a fuller range of the meanings generative of and 
associated with it, in its historical context. It also enables us to recognize passive revolution 
as primarily a contribution to the central strategic debates of the Marxist tradition of 
Gramsci’s time, and thus to consider the role that uses of passive revolution might play in 
a similar attempted “sublation” of the revolution in permanence in contemporary 
conditions. The meaning and significance of passive revolution for us today is certainly 
not exhausted by acknowledging the conditions and modality of its original formulation; 
but such an assessment is the necessary precondition for a meaningful form of its 
contemporary “actualization,” that is, its transformative inheritance. 
